01. Gold into Base Metals: Productivity Growth in the People’s Republic of China during the Reform Period
Alwyn Young 芝加哥大学（现：伦敦政治经济学院）
With minimal sleight of hand, it is possible to transform the recent growth experience of the People’s Republic of China from the extraordinary into the mundane. Systematic understatement of inflation by enterprises accounts for 2.5 percent growth per year in the nonagricultural economy during the first two decades of the reform period (1978–98). The usual suspects (i.e., rising participation rates, improvements in educational attainment, and the transfer of labor out of agriculture) account for most of the remainder. The productivity performance of the nonagricultural economy during the reform period is respectable but not outstanding. To the degree that the reforms have improved efficiency, these gains may lie principally in agriculture.
02. The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence from Rising Sex Ratios and Savings Rates in China
The high and rising household savings rate in China is not easily reconciled with the traditional explanations that emphasize life cycle factors, the precautionary saving motive, financial development, or habit formation. This paper proposes a new competitive saving motive: as the sex ratio rises, Chinese parents with a son raise their savings in a competitive manner in order to improve their son’s relative attractiveness for marriage. The pressure on savings spills over to other households. Both cross-regional and household-level evidence supports this hypothesis. This factor can potentially account for about half the actual increase in the household savings rate during 1990–2007.
03. The Impact of China’s Economic Reforms on Agricultural Productivity Growth
John McMillan 加利福尼亚大学圣迭戈分校（曾：斯坦福大学）
John Whalley 西安大略大学(University of Western Ontario）
Lijing Zhu 西安大略大学(University of Western Ontario）
This paper presents a method for assessing the relative importance of price increases and strengthened individual incentives due to the introduction of the responsibility system for the post-1978 increase in China's agricultural productivity. Data on post-1978 Chinese agricultural performance suggest that a little over three-quarters of the measured productivity increase is due to payment system changes and the remainder to price increases. We also use our method to calculate incentive indices, giving an estimate of the fraction of their marginal product that peasants received under the pre-1978 regime.
04. Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China’s Dual‐Track Approach to Transition
Lawrence J. Lau 斯坦福大学
Gérard Roland 布鲁塞尔自由大学（现：加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校）
This paper develops a simple model to analyze the dual-track approach to market liberalization as a mechanism for implementing efficient Pareto-improving economic reform, that is, reform achieving efficiency without creating losers. The approach, based on the continued enforcement of the existing plan while simultaneously liberalizing the market, can be understood as a method for making implicit lump-sum transfers to compensate potential losers of the reform. The model highlights the critical roles of enforcement of the plan for achieving Pareto improvement and full liberalization of the market track for achieving efficiency. We examine how the dual-track approach has worked in product and labor market liberalization in China.
05. Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from “Missing Imports” in China
Raymond Fisman 哥伦比亚大学、美国国家经济研究局（现：波士顿大学）
Tax evasion, by its very nature, is difficult to observe. We quantify the effects of tax rates on tax evasion by examining the relationship in China between the tariff schedule and the “evasion gap,” which we define as the difference between Hong Kong’s reported exports to China at the product level and China’s reported imports from Hong Kong. Our results imply that a one-percentage-point increase in the tax rate is associated with a 3 percent increase in evasion. Furthermore, the evasion gap is negatively correlated with tax rates on closely related products, suggesting that evasion takes place partly through misclassification of imports from higher-taxed categories to lower-taxed ones, in addition to underreporting the value of imports.
06. China’s Evolving Managerial Labor Market
Theodore Groves 加利福尼亚大学圣迭戈分校
John McMillan 加利福尼亚大学圣迭戈分校（曾：斯坦福大学）
Barry Naughton 加利福尼亚大学圣迭戈分校
Recent reforms of Chinese state-owned enterprises strengthened a nascent managerial labor market by incorporating incentives suggestive of competitive Western labor markets. Poorly performing firms were more likely to have a new manager selected by auction, to be required to post a higher security deposit, and to be subject to more frequent review of the manager's contract. Managers could be, and were, fired for poor performance. Managerial pay was linked to the firm's sales and profits, and reform strengthened the profit link and weakened the sales link. Thus the economic reforms helped develop an improved system of managerial resource allocation responsive to market forces.
07. The Impact of Economic Reform on the Performance of Chinese State Enterprises, 1980–1989
The effectiveness of China’s incremental industrial reform between 1980 and 1989 is investigated using a panel data set of 272 state enterprises. This paper applies a method that measures marginal products of factors and changes in total factor productivity (TFP) by comparing actual changes in output to actual changes in inputs and in the institutional environment. This paper finds that there were marked improvements in the marginal productivity of factors and in TFP between 1980 and 1989. More important, the evidence shows that over 87 percent of the TFP growth was attributable to improved incentives, intensified product market competition, and improved factor allocation.
08. Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis in 1959-1961
The agricultural crisis in China in 1959-61, after the initial success of the collectivization movement, resulted in 30 million extra deaths. In this paper, a game theory hypothesis proposes the main cause of this catastrophe. I argue that, because of the difficulty in supervising agricultural work, the success of an agricultural collective depends on a self-enforcing contract, in which each one promises to discipline oneself. A self-enforcing contract, however, can be sustained only in a repeated game. In the fall of 1958, the right to withdraw from a collective was deprived. The nature of the collectivization was thus changed from a repeated game to a one-time game. As a result, the self-enforcing contract could not be sustained and agricultural productivity collapsed. The empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis.
09. Redistribution in a Decentralized Economy: Growth and Inflation in China under Reform
Loren Brandt 多伦多大学
Despite expanding at an annual rate of nearly 9 percent, China’s economy has exhibited a marked cyclical pattern: Periods of rapid growth, accompanied by accelerating inflation, are followed by contractions during which both growth and inflation fall. A widening gap also emerged between the output contribution of the state sector and its share of investment and employment. In this paper, we offer a consistent explanation for this behavior that reflects several key institutional features of China’s economic reform: (i) economic decentralization, (ii) the government’s commitment to the state sector, and (iii) the credit plan and credit control.
10. Plan and Market in China’s Agricultural Commerce
哈佛大学（现：西安大略大学(University of Western Ontario））Google Scholar引用量：258
This article examines interactions between markets and state commercial planning in the context of China's agricultural sector. It begins with a discussion of recent trends in agricultural planning and commerce in China and then presents a theoretical model that analyzes the way that a mixed commercial system of the sort observed in China functions. The theoretical analysis suggests that a mixed system is sustainable and can have desirable efficiency and distributional effects. Markets, however, limit the range of sustainable plans, and in the presence of markets, state planning may no longer directly influence production and consumption behavior.