发表时间：July 2005

Google Scholar引用量：4463

Franklin Allen 宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院（现：帝国理工学院商学院）

钱军 波士顿学院卡罗尔管理学院（现：复旦大学泛海国际金融学院）

钱美君 波士顿学院卡罗尔管理学院（现：澳大利亚国立大学）

发表时间：May 2007

Google Scholar引用量：2741

范博宏 香港中文大学

T.J. Wong 香港中文大学（现：南加州大学马歇尔商学院）

张田余 香港城市大学（现：香港中文大学（深圳））

发表时间：November 2003

Google Scholar引用量：1371

孙谦 南洋理工大学商学院（现：复旦大学管理学院）

Wilson H. S Tong 香港理工大学会计与金融学院

We evaluate the performance changes of 634 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed on China's two exchanges upon share issuing privatisation (SIP) in the period 1994–1998. We find that SIP is effective in improving SOEs’ earnings ability, real sales, and workers’ productivity but is not successful in improving profit returns and leverage after privatisation. We also find state ownership having negative impacts on firm performance and legal-person ownership having positive impacts on firm performance after SIP, which suggests that legal persons behave differently from the state government. Surprisingly, foreign ownership does not show uniformly strong, positive impacts on firm performance.

发表时间：October 2010

Google Scholar引用量：1176

姜国华 北京大学光华管理学院

Charles M. C. Lee 斯坦福大学工商管理研究生院

岳衡 北大光华管理学院（现：新加坡管理大学）

发表时间：July 2005

Google Scholar引用量：1165

Robert Cull 世界银行发展研究组

徐立新 世界银行发展研究组、北京大学光华管理学院

Johnson et al. (2002. American Economic Review 92 (5), 1335–1356) examine the relative importance of property rights and external finance in several Eastern European countries. They find property rights to be overwhelmingly important, while external finance explains little of firm reinvestment. McMillan and Woodruff (2002. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (3), 153–170) further conjecture that as transition moves along, market-supporting (financial) institutions should become more important. This paper reexamines those issues in the context of China in 2002, when the transition had moved far. We also find that secure property rights are a significant predictor of firm reinvestment. However, in line with McMillan and Woodruff, we find that access to external finance in the form of bank loans is also associated with more reinvestment. Following Acemoglu and Johnson (2003. Unbundling institutions. Unpublished working paper 9934, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA), we separate our proxies for the security of property rights into two groups: those measuring the risk of expropriation by the government and those measuring the ease and reliability of contract enforcement. Whereas those authors’ cross-country results suggest that risk of expropriation is the more severe impediment to economic development, ours indicate that both expropriation risk and contract enforcement play a role in Chinese firms’ reinvestment decisions. We also find that another aspect of property rights, the extent of private ownership, is associated with greater reinvestment. At China's current stage of development, expropriation risk, contract enforcement, access to finance, and ownership structure all appear to matter for reinvestment decisions. Some evidence also exists that access to finance and government expropriation affect small firms more than large ones.

发表时间：March 2010

Google Scholar引用量：918

Ferdinand A. Gul 香港理工大学（现：迪肯大学商学院）

Jeong-Bon Kim(金正本) 香港城市大学会计学系

Annie A. Qiu 中信证券

This paper investigates the effects of largest-shareholder ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and audit quality on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity, of Chinese-listed firms over the 1996–2003 period. We show that synchronicity is a concave function of ownership by the largest shareholder with its maximum at an approximate 50% level. Further, we find that synchronicity is higher when the largest shareholder is government related. We also find that foreign ownership and auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity. Finally, we show that the amount of earnings information reflected in stock returns is lower for firms with high synchronicity.

发表时间：September 2014

Google Scholar引用量：306

廖理 清华大学五道口金融学院

刘碧波 清华大学、中信证券（现：清华大学五道口金融学院）

王浩 清华大学经济管理学院

The Split-Share Structure Reform granted legitimate trading rights to the state-owned shares of listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), opening up the gate to China׳s secondary privatization. The expectation of privatization quickly boosted SOE output, profits, and employment, but did not change their operating efficiency and corporate governance. The improvements to SOE performance are positively correlated to government agents’ privatization-led incentive of increasing state-owned share value. In terms of privatization methodology, the reform adopted a market mechanism that played an effective information discovery role in aligning the interests of the government and public investors.

发表时间：January 2014

Google Scholar引用量：302

Joseph D. Piotroski 斯坦福大学工商管理研究生院

张田余 香港中文大学（现：香港中文大学（深圳））

This paper shows that incentives created by the impending turnover of local politicians can accelerate the pace of initial public offering (IPO) activity in certain politicized environments. Focusing on China, we exploit a research setting where politicians are rewarded for capital market development, firms rely on political connections for access to capital, rent-seeking behavior is rampant, and the objectives of the state might not be to maximize capital market efficiency. We find that the rate of exchange eligible firms engaging in an IPO temporarily increases in advance of impending political promotion events. This effect holds for both state-owned and non-state-owned entities. For state-owned firms, the effect is strongest in those provinces where the politicians are more likely to be rewarded for market development activity. For non-state-owned firms, the temporary increase in IPO activity appears to be (rationally) opportunistic in nature, with the effect stronger around events more likely to disrupt the firms' political connections. Promotion period IPOs underperform non-promotion period IPOs in terms of both future financial performance and long-run stock returns, have controlling shareholders who retain a larger fraction of the company, and are more likely to divert proceeds away from their intended use after the offering.

发表时间：June 2010

Google Scholar引用量：253

Charles W. Calomiris 哥伦比亚大学商学院

Raymond Fisman 哥伦比亚大学商学院（现：波士顿大学）

汪勇祥 哥伦比亚大学商学院、中国人民大学财政金融学院、江西财经大学（现：上海高级金融学院）

We examine the market response to an unexpected announcement of the sale of government-owned shares in China. In contrast to earlier work, we find a negative effect of government ownership on returns at the announcement date and a symmetric positive effect from the policy's cancellation. We suggest that this results from the absence of a Chinese political transition to accompany economic reforms, so that the benefits of political ties outweigh the efficiency costs of government shareholdings. Companies managed by former government officials have positive abnormal returns, suggesting that personal ties can substitute for government ownership as a source of connections.

发表时间：March 2019

Google Scholar引用量：210

刘佳楠 宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院

Robert F. Stambaugh 宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院

袁宇 上海鸣石投资管理有限公司、宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿金融机构中心

We construct size and value factors in China. The size factor excludes the smallest 30% of firms, which are companies valued significantly as potential shells in reverse mergers that circumvent tight IPO constraints. The value factor is based on the earnings-price ratio, which subsumes the book-to-market ratio in capturing all Chinese value effects. Our three-factor model strongly dominates a model formed by just replicating the Fama and French (1993) procedure in China. Unlike that model, which leaves a 17% annual alpha on the earnings-price factor, our model explains most reported Chinese anomalies, including profitability and volatility anomalies.