
学术前沿速递|经济学顶刊AER,QJE,JPE,RES,Econometrica 最新发表(5.20-5.26)

本文汇总了经济学国际顶级期刊《American Economic Review》、《Quarterly Journal of Economics》、《Journal of Political Economy》、《The Review of Economic Studies》和《Econometrica》近期即将发表的论文,提供经济学研究领域最新学术动态。

Forthcoming
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Advance Articles
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Advance Articles
01. Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Model with Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Income Risk
Posted on: 22 May 2022

Sebastian Dyrda
University of Toronto

Marcelo Pedroni
University of Amsterdam
Abstract: We study optimal fiscal policy in a standard incomplete-markets model with uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk, where a Ramsey planner chooses time-varying paths of proportional capital and labor income taxes, lump-sum transfers (or taxes), and government debt. We find that: (1) short-run capital income taxes are effective in providing redistribution since the tax base is relatively unequal and inelastic; (2) an increasing pattern of labor income taxes over time mitigates intertemporal distortions from capital income taxes; (3) the optimal policy increases overall transfers, calibrated initially to the US welfare system, by roughly 50 percent; (4) two-thirds of the welfare gains come from redistribution and the remaining third come mostly from insurance; and (5) redistribution also leads to a more efficient allocation of labor via wealth effects on labor supply—lower productivity households can afford to work relatively less.
我们研究了一个标准的不完全市场模型中的最优财政政策,该模型具有不可保险的特异性收入风险,其中拉姆齐计划者选择了时间变化的资本和劳动所得税比例、一次性转移支付(或税收)和政府债务的路径。我们发现。(1)短期资本所得税在提供再分配方面是有效的,因为税基是相对不平等和无弹性的;(2)随着时间的推移,劳动所得税的增加模式减轻了资本所得税的跨期扭曲;(3)最佳政策增加了整体转移,最初校准为美国的福利制度,大约为50%。(4) 三分之二的福利收益来自再分配,其余三分之一主要来自保险;(5) 再分配也通过财富对劳动力供应的影响导致更有效的劳动力分配--生产力较低的家庭可以负担相对较少的工作。
Link: https://www.restud.com/paper/optimal-fiscal-policy-in-a-model-with-uninsurable-idiosyncratic-income-risk/
02. Preferences and Performance in Simultaneous First-Price Auctions: A Structural Analysis
Posted on: 22 May 2022

Matthew Gentry
Florida State University

Pasquale Schiraldi
London School of Economics and Political Science

Tatiana Komarova
London School of Economics and Political Science
Abstract: Motivated by the prevalence of simultaneous bidding across a wide range of auction markets, we develop and estimate a model of strategic interaction in simultaneous first-price auctions when objects are heterogeneous and bidders have nonadditive preferences over combinations. We establish non-parametric identification of primitives in this model under standard exclusion restrictions, providing a basis for both estimation and testing of preferences over combinations. We then apply our model to data on Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) highway procurement auctions, quantifying the magnitude of cost synergies and evaluating the performance of the simultaneous first-price mechanism in the MDOT marketplace.
在广泛的拍卖市场上普遍存在的同时出价的激励下,我们建立并估计了一个当对象是异质的并且投标人对组合具有非加性偏好时,同时第一价格拍卖中的战略互动模型。我们在这个模型中建立了标准排除限制下的基元的非参数识别,为组合偏好的估计和测试提供了基础。然后,我们将我们的模型应用于密歇根州交通局(MDOT)的公路采购拍卖数据,量化成本协同效应的大小,并评估MDOT市场上同步第一价格机制的表现。
Link: https://www.restud.com/paper/preferences-and-performance-in-simultaneous-first-price-auctions-a-structural-analysis/
03. Market Power in Neoclassical Growth Models
Posted on: 22 May 2022

Laurence Ball
Johns Hopkins University

N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
Abstract: This paper examines the optimal accumulation of capital and the effects of government debt in neoclassical growth models in which firms have market power and therefore charge prices above marginal cost. In this environment, the real interest rate earned by savers is less than the net marginal product of capital. We establish a new method for evaluating dynamic efficiency that can be applied in such economies. A plausible calibration suggests that the wedge between the real interest rate and the marginal product of capital is about 4 percentage points and that the U.S. economy is dynamically efficient. In addition, government Ponzi schemes can have different implications for welfare than they do under competition. Even if the government can sustain a perpetual rollover of debt and accumulating interest, the policy may nonetheless reduce welfare by depressing steady-state capital and aggregate consumption. These findings suggest that even with low interest rates, as have been observed recently, fiscal policymakers should still be concerned about the crowding-out effects of government debt.
本文研究了新古典主义增长模型中资本的最佳积累和政府债务的影响,在这些模型中,企业拥有市场力量,因此收取高于边际成本的价格。在这种环境下,储蓄者获得的实际利率小于资本的净边际产品。我们建立了一个新的方法来评估动态效率,可以适用于这种经济体。一个合理的校准表明,实际利率和资本边际产品之间的楔子约为4个百分点,美国经济是动态效率的。此外,政府的庞氏骗局对福利的影响可能与竞争下的不同。即使政府能够维持债务的永久滚动和累积的利息,该政策仍然可能通过压制稳态资本和总消费而减少福利。这些发现表明,即使像最近观察到的那样,利率很低,财政政策制定者仍应关注政府债务的挤出效应。
Link: https://www.restud.com/paper/market-power-in-neoclassical-growth-models/
04. Redeemable Platform Currencies
Posted on: 22 May 2022
Kenneth Rogoff
Harvard University
Yang You
The University of Hong Kong
Abstract: Can massive online retailers such as Amazon and Alibaba issue digital tokens that potentially compete with bank debit accounts? There is a long history of trading stamps and loyalty points, but new technologies are poised to sharply raise the significance of redeemable assets as a store of value. Here we develop a simple stylized model of redeemable tokens that can be used to study sales and pricing strategies for issuing tokens, including ICOs. Our central finding is that platforms can potentially earn higher revenues by making tokens non-tradable unless they can generate a sufficiently high outside-platform convenience yield.
亚马逊和阿里巴巴等大型在线零售商能否发行有可能与银行借记账户竞争的数字代币?邮票和忠诚度积分的交易由来已久,但新技术正准备大幅提高可赎回资产作为价值存储的意义。在这里,我们开发了一个简单的可赎回代币的风格化模型,可以用来研究发行代币的销售和定价策略,包括ICOs。我们的核心发现是,平台可以通过使代币不可交易来获得更高的收入,除非他们能产生足够高的平台外便利收益。
Link: https://www.restud.com/paper/redeemable-platform-currencies/

Just Accepted
01. A Semi-structural Methodology for Policy Counterfactuals
Posted on: 20 May 2022

Martin Beraja
MIT Department of Economics
Abstract: I propose a methodology for constructing counterfactuals with respect to changes in pol- icy rules which does not require fully specifying a particular model,yet is not subject to Lucas Critique.It applies to a class of dynamic stochastic models whose equilibria are well approximated by a linear representation.It rests on the insight that many such models sat isfy a principle of counterfactual equivalence: they are observationally equivalent under a benchmark policy and yield an identical counterfactual equilibrium under an alternative one.
我提出了一种针对政策规则变化构建反事实的方法,它不需要完全指定一个特定的模型,但不受卢卡斯批判的影响。它适用于一类动态随机模型,这些模型的均衡被线性表示法很好地近似了。它基于这样的见解:许多这样的模型符合反事实等价原则:它们在一个基准政策下是观察上的等价,在另一个政策下产生相同的反事实均衡。
Link: https://doi.org/10.1086/720982
02. Attraction Versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets
Posted on: 20 May 2022
Pak Hung Au
Hong Kong University
Mark Whitmeyer
Arizona State University
Abstract: We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions,in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean.In the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game,the coun- tervailing incentives of attraction and persuasion yield a payoff function for each firm that is linear in the firm's realized effective value.If the expected quality of the products is suffi- ciently high (or competition is sufficiently fierce),this corresponds to full information-firms provide the first-best level of information.If not,this corresponds to information dispersion- firms randomize over signals.
我们考虑了一个具有搜索摩擦的市场中的寡头竞争模型,在这个模型中,拥有未知质量产品的竞争企业会宣传消费者的访问会收集到多少信息。在这个博弈的唯一对称均衡中,吸引和说服的激励对每个企业都产生了一个回报函数,该函数与企业的实际有效价值呈线性关系。如果产品的预期质量足够高(或者竞争足够激烈),这就对应于完全信息--企业提供第一最佳水平的信息。如果不是,这就对应于信息分散--企业在信号上随机化。
Link: https://doi.org/10.1086/720984
03. Collective Brand Reputation
Posted on: 20 May 2022

Volker Nocke
University of Mannheim

Roland Strausz
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Abstract: We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product. quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect. public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality signals generated in different markets. Such aggregation yields a beneficial informativeness effect for incentivizing the global player. It however also induces harmful free-riding by local, market-specific players. The resulting tradeoff yields a theory of optimal brand size and revenue sharing that applies to platform markets, franchising, licensing. umbrella branding, and firms with team production.
我们为市场建立了一个集体品牌声誉的理论,在这个市场中,产品的质量是由本地和全球参与者共同决定的。在一个不完善的公共监督的重复博弈中,我们将集体品牌塑造为不同市场中产生的质量信号的聚合。这种聚合产生了激励全球参与者的有利信息效应。然而,它也诱发了当地特定市场参与者的有害搭便车行为。由此产生的权衡产生了一个最佳品牌规模和收入分享的理论,适用于平台市场、特许经营、许可、伞状品牌和团队生产的公司。
Link: https://doi.org/10.1086/720986

Forthcoming Articles
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