Abstract：Do financial crises radicalize voters? We study Germany's 1931 banking crisis, collecting new data on bank branches and firm‐bank connections. Exploiting cross‐sectional variation in pre‐crisis exposure to the bank at the center of the crisis, we show that Nazi votes surged in locations more affected by its failure. Radicalization in response to the shock was exacerbated in cities with a history of anti‐Semitism. After the Nazis seized power, both pogroms and deportations were more frequent in places affected by the banking crisis. Our results suggest an important synergy between financial distress and cultural predispositions, with far‐reaching consequences.
Abstract：We analyze the effects of regulatory interference in compensation contracts, focusing on recent mandatory deferral and clawback requirements restricting incentive compensation of material risk‐takers in the financial sector. Moderate deferral requirements have a robustly positive effect on risk‐management effort only if the bank manager's outside option is sufficiently high; otherwise, their effectiveness depends on the dynamics of information arrival. Stringent deferral requirements unambiguously backfire. Our normative analysis characterizes whether and how deferral and clawback requirements should supplement capital regulation as part of the optimal policy mix.
Abstract：We study capital requirement regulation in a dynamic quantitative model in which nonfinancial firms, as well as households, hold deposits. A novel general equilibrium channel that operates through firms deposits mitigates the cost of increasing capital requirements. In the calibrated model, (a) the optimal capital requirement is 7.3 percentage points higher than in a comparable model in which all the deposits are held by households, and (b) setting the capital requirement higher than the true optimum is not as costly as one would gauge from the comparable model. We also provide some independent evidence that supports our novel channel.
Abstract：We show that production networks are important for the transmission of unconventional monetary policy. Firms with bonds eligible for purchase under the European Central Bank’s Corporate Sector Purchase Program act as financial intermediaries by extending additional trade credit to their customers. The increase in trade credit is pronounced from core countries to periphery countries and for financially constrained customers. Customers then increase investment and employment in response to the increased trade financing, whereas suppliers expand their customer base, contributing to upstream industry concentration. Our findings suggest that trade credit redistributes the effects of monetary policy across regions and firms.