01. Are Chinese Cities Too Small?
Chun-Chung Au 布朗大学
J. Vernon Henderson 布朗大学（现：布朗大学和伦敦政治经济学院）
This paper models and estimates net urban agglomeration economies for cities. Economic models of cities postulate an inverted U shape of real income per worker against city employment, where the inverted U shifts with industrial composition across the urban hierarchy of cities. This relationship has never been estimated, in part because of data requirements. China has the necessary data and context. We find that urban agglomeration benefits are high—real incomes per worker rise sharply with increases in city size from a low level. They level out nearer the peak and then decline very slowly past the peak. We find that a large fraction of cities in China are undersized due to nationally imposed, strong migration restrictions, resulting in large income losses.
02. Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
Eric Maskin 哈佛大学
Yingyi Qian（钱颖一） 斯坦福大学（现：清华大学）
We model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a technology (here consisting of a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants beneath him. We argue that different organizational forms give rise to different information about managers' performance and therefore differ according to how effective incentives can be in encouraging a good performance. In particular, we show that, under certain assumptions, the M-form (multi-divisional form) is likely to provide better incentives than the U-form (unitary form) because it promotes yardstick competition (i.e. relative performance evaluation) more effectively. We conclude by presenting evidence that the assumptions on which this comparison rests are satisfied for Chinese data.
03. Do Population Control Policies Induce More Human Capital Investment? Twins, Birth Weight and China's “One-Child” Policy
Mark R. Rosenzweig 耶鲁大学
In this paper, we address the issues of whether reductions in fertility increase human capital investments per child and whether twinning can identify the quantity—quality (Q-Q) trade-off. We show that estimates of the effects of twinning at higher parities on the outcomes of older children in prior studies do not identify family-size effects but are confounded by inter-child allocation effects because of the endowment deficit and close spacing of twins. However, examining the effects of twinning by birth order, net of the effects stemming from the endowment deficit of twins, can provide upper and lower bounds on the trade-off between the family size and average child quality. Our estimates, based on data from China, indicate that an extra child at parity one or at parity two, net of one component of birth-endowment effects associated with birth weight, significantly decreases the schooling progress, the expected college enrolment, grades in school and the assessed health of all children in the family. Despite the evident significant trade-off between number of children and child quality in China, the findings suggest that the contribution of the one-child policy in China to the development of its human capital was modest.
04. The Mortality Cost of Political Connections
Raymond Fisman 哥伦比亚大学（现：波士顿大学）
We study the relationship between the political connections of Chinese firms and workplace fatalities. In our preferred specification, we find that the worker death rate for connected companies is two to three times that of unconnected firms (depending on the sample employed), a pattern that holds for within-firm estimations. The connections–mortality relationship is attenuated in provinces where safety regulators' promotion is contingent on meeting safety targets. In the absence of fatalities, connected firms receive fewer reports of major violations for safety compliance, whereas in years of fatal accidents the rate of reported violations is identical. Moreover, fatal accidents produce negative returns at connected companies and are associated with the subsequent departure of well-connected executives. These results provide suggestive evidence that connections enable firms to avoid (potentially costly) compliance measures, rather than using connections to avoid regulatory response after accidents occur. Our findings emphasize the social costs of political connections, and suggest that appropriate regulatory incentives may be useful in mitigating these costs.
05. The Institutional Causes of China's Great Famine, 1959–1961
Xin Meng 澳大利亚国立大学
Pierre Yared 哥伦比亚大学
This article studies the causes of China's Great Famine, during which 16.5 to 45 million individuals perished in rural areas. We document that average rural food retention during the famine was too high to generate a severe famine without rural inequality in food availability; that there was significant variance in famine mortality rates across rural regions; and that rural mortality rates were positively correlated with per capita food production, a surprising pattern that is unique to the famine years. We provide evidence that an inflexible and progressive government procurement policy (where procurement could not adjust to contemporaneous production and larger shares of expected production were procured from more productive regions) was necessary for generating this pattern and that this policy was a quantitatively important contributor to overall famine mortality.
06. Quid Pro Quo: Technology Capital Transfers for Market Access in China
Thomas J. Holmes 明尼苏达大学和明尼阿波利斯联邦储备银行
Ellen R. McGrattan 明尼苏达大学和明尼阿波利斯联邦储备银行
Edward C. Prescott 亚利桑那州立大学和明尼阿波利斯联邦储备银行
By the 1970s, quid pro quo policy, which requires multinational firms to transfer technology in return for market access, had become a common practice in many developing countries. While many countries have subsequently liberalized quid pro quo requirements, China continues to follow the policy. In this article, we incorporate quid pro quo policy into a multicountry dynamic general equilibrium model, using microevidence from Chinese patents to motivate key assumptions about the terms of the technology transfer deals and macroevidence on China's inward foreign direct investment (FDI) to estimate key model parameters. We then use the model to quantify the impact of China's quid pro quo policy and show that it has had a significant impact on global innovation and welfare.
07. Detection and Impact of Industrial Subsidies: The Case of Chinese Shipbuilding
Myrto Kalouptsidi 哈佛大学，经济政策研究中心，美国国家经济研究局
This article provides a model-based empirical strategy to, (1) detect the presence and gauge the magnitude of government subsidies and (2) quantify their impact on production reallocation across countries, industry prices, costs and consumer surplus. I construct and estimate an industry model that allows for dynamic agents in both demand and supply and apply my strategy to world shipbuilding, a classic target of industrial policy. I find strong evidence consistent with China having intervened and reducing shipyard costs by 13–20%, corresponding to 1.5 to 4.5 billion US dollars, between 2006 and 2012. The subsidies led to substantial reallocation of ship production across the world, with Japan, in particular, losing significant market share. They also misaligned costs and production, while leading to minor surplus gains for shippers.
08. Better Lucky Than Rich? Welfare Analysis of Automobile Licence Allocations in Beijing and Shanghai
Shanjun Li 康奈尔大学和美国国家经济研究局
Economists often favour market-based mechanisms over non-market based mechanisms to allocate scarce public resources on grounds of economic efficiency and revenue generation. When the usage of the resources in question generates type-dependent negative externalities, the welfare comparison can become ambiguous. Both types of allocation mechanisms are being implemented in China's major cities to distribute limited vehicle licences as a measure to combat worsening traffic congestion and air pollution. While Beijing employs non-transferable lotteries, Shanghai uses an auction system. This article empirically quantifies the welfare consequences of the two mechanisms by taking into account both allocation efficiency and automobile externalities post-allocation. Our analysis shows that different allocation mechanisms lead to dramatic differences in social welfare. Although Beijing's lottery system has a large advantage in reducing automobile externalities over auction, the advantage is offset by the significant allocative cost from misallocation. The lottery system in Beijing resulted in a social welfare loss of 30 billion Yuan (nearly $5 billion) in 2012 alone. A uniform-price auction would have generated nearly 20 billion Yuan to Beijing municipal government, more than covering all its subsidies to the local public transit system.
09. China’s Model of Managing the Financial System
Markus K. Brunnermeier 普林斯顿大学和美国国家经济研究局
Michael Sockin 得克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校
China’s economic model involves regular and intensive government interventions in financial markets, while Western policymakers often refrain from substantial interventions outside crisis periods. We develop a theoretical framework to rationalize the approaches of both China and the West to managing the financial system as being optimal given the differences in their respective economies. In this framework, a government leans against trading of noise traders but at the expense of introducing policy noise to the market. Our welfare analysis shows that under certain underlying economic conditions, the optimal government policy induces a government-centric equilibrium, in which government intervention is so intensive that all investors choose to acquire private information about policy noise rather than fundamentals. This policy regime characterizes China’s approach with financial stability prioritized over other policy objectives.
10. Property Rights, Land Misallocation, and Agricultural Efficiency in China
Amalavoyal Chari 萨塞克斯大学
Elaine M. Liu 休斯顿大学和美国国家经济研究局
Shing-Yi Wang 宾夕法尼亚大学和美国国家经济研究局
This article examines the impact of a property rights reform in rural China that allowed farmers to lease out their land. We find the reform led to increases in land rental activity in rural households. Our results indicate that the formalization of leasing rights resulted in a redistribution of land toward more-productive farmers. Consequently, output and aggregate productivity increased by 8% and 10%, respectively. We also find that the reform increased the responsiveness of land allocation across crops to changes in crop prices.
11. The Role of Firm Factors in Demand, Cost, and Export Market Selection for Chinese Footwear Producers
Mark J. Roberts 宾夕法尼亚州立大学和美国国家经济研究局
Daniel Yi Xu 杜克大学和美国国家经济研究局
Xiaoyan Fan（樊潇彦） 复旦大学
Shengxing Zhang 伦敦政治经济学院
In this article, we use micro data on both trade and production for a sample of large Chinese manufacturing firms in the footwear industry from 2002 to 2006 to estimate an empirical model of export demand, pricing, and market participation by destination market. We use the model to construct indexes of firm-level demand, marginal cost, and fixed cost. The empirical results indicate substantial firm heterogeneity in all three dimension with demand being the most dispersed. The firm-specific demand and marginal cost components account for over 30% of market share variation, 40% of sales variation, and over 50% of price variation among exporters. The fixed cost index is the primary factor explaining differences in the pattern of destination markets across firms. The estimates are used to analyse the supply reallocation following the removal of the quota on Chinese footwear exports to the EU. This led to a rapid restructuring of export supply sources on both the intensive and extensive margins in favour of firms with high demand and low fixed costs indexes, with marginal cost differences not being important.
12. Firm Response to Competitive Shocks: Evidence from China’s Minimum Wage Policy
Harald Hau 日内瓦大学，瑞士金融研究所，经济政策研究中心
Yi Huang 日内瓦国际与发展研究院，经济政策研究中心
Gewei Wang 中国人民大学
The large regional variation in minimum wage levels during the period 2002–8 in China implies that Chinese manufacturing firms experienced competitive shocks as a function of firm location and their low-wage employment share. We find that minimum wage hikes accelerate the input substitution from labour to capital, reduce employment growth and accelerate total factor productivity growth—particularly among the less productive firms under private Chinese or foreign ownership, but not among state-owned enterprises. The heterogeneous firm response to labour cost shocks can be explained by differences in management practices and suggests that management quality and competitive pressure are complementary.
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