我们提供的直接证据表明，当政府能够确定债权人时，它们会选择性地违约。通过对一组全面的次债数据进行分析

我们发现了：

中国地方政府选择对政治实力较弱的银行违约

一家银行相对于其他银行的政治权力的削弱，会增加地方政府选择性违约的可能性。

这种默认选择是由银行对政客晋升的影响力驱动的。

地方政界人士地位较高或与国家领导人有联系时，他们很少参与选择性违约，因为他们的晋升受到银行贷款违约的影响较小。我们的研究结果表明，政府违约受到了一种政治-金融关系的约束。

We provide direct evidence that governments selectively default on debt when they can identify creditors. Analyzing a comprehensive data set of subnational debt, 

We show that

Chinese local governments choose to default on banks with weaker prolitical power

A reduction in a bank's political power relative to other banks increases the likelihood of selective default by local governments.

Such default selections are driven by banks’ influence over politician promotion. 

When local politicians are highly ranked or connected to national leaders, they engage less in selective default as their promotion is less affected by bank loan defaults. Our findings suggest a politics-finance nexus through which government defaults are restrained.

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